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TRUSTS: CONDUIT THEORY ADOPTED TO ALLOCATE
REGULATED INVESTMENT COMPANY'S CAPITAL
GAINS DIVIDEND TO PRINCIPAL
REGULATED investment company distributions from capital gains, in
whatever form, are properly allocated to principal, absent the con-
trary intention of the settlor, according to the recent case of Tait v.
Peck,' decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Petitioner, a widow and the life beneficiary of an inter vivos
trust established by her husband, sought a declaratory judgment
that the capital gains dividends from a regulated investment com-
pany, payable in cash or stock at the trustee's option, were income.
Both the individual remaindermen and the trustee, respondents, as-
serted that the distribution was a return of capital and should be
added to principal. The parties stipulated that -the trust instrument
did not show the settlor's intention with respect to capital gains
distributions. Unencumbered by Massachusetts precedent, the court
surveyed the conflicting arguments and adopted the view that a
regulated investment company is functionally a conduit for passing
any realized capital gains to the trust fund, and that these gains
should retain their character as principal.2
Though controversy over the proper allocation of capital gains
dividends declared by regulated investment companies has been
both fierce and long,3 all courts which previously have decided the
issue have allocated this type dividend to income rather than to
principal.4 Where the trustee has the option to take either cash or
1 194 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 1963).
2 Id. at 713-14.
3 For a brief discussion and rejoinder of the partisan view points, see Shattuck,
Capital Gain Distributions-Principal or Income?, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 160 (1949);
Young, A Dissent on Capital Gain Distributions, 88 TRUsTs & ESTATES 280 (1949);
Shattuck, Further Comment on Capital Gain Distributions, 88 TRUsTS & ESTATES 429
(1949); Young, More About Capital Gains, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATES 467 (1949).
See generally BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTES § 858 (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
BOGERT]; 3 Scorr, TRUSTS § 236.14, at 1844-45 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as
ScOTr]; Cohan & Dean, Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment
of Stock Proceeds: The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 157, 181-
83 (1957); Dunham, Scott & Wolf, Uniform Revised Principal and Income Act-Discus-
sion of Newly Promulgated Statute, 101 TRusTs & ESTATES 894, 897 (1962).
'Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601 (1960); Briel v. Moody, 77
N.J. Super. 306, 186 A.2d 314 (Ch. 1962); In the Matter of Bruce's Trust, 192 Misc.
523, 81 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1948); In the Matter of Estate of Snitzer, 33 Misc. 2d 692,
226 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Surr. Ct. 1962); In the Matter of Estate of Appleby, 15 Misc. 2d 200,
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stock, the dividends have been treated as cash distributions, regard-
less of the trustee's choice.5 These decisions conform to the ma-
jority rule adopted by the Uniform Principal and Income Act6 which
looks solely to the form of the distribution.7  The present decision
represents an exception to the general rule by holding that the
source, regardless of the form, should control the allocation of a
regulated investment company's dividend between income and prin-
cipal. s This casenote analyzes the validity of the various arguments
175 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1958), 27 FoRDHAm L. Rxv. 645 (1959); In the Matter
of Estate of Byrne, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Lovett Estate (No. 2),
78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. 1951). See Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d 874, 876
(Mo. 1957); In re Whitehead's Will Trusts, [1959] 1 Ch. 579, 590-92.
GE.g., Coates v. Coates, supra note 4; In the Matter of Estate of Appleby, supra
note 4; In the Matter of Will of Hurd, 203 Misc. 966, 120 N.Y.S.2d 103 (Surr. Ct.
1953); Kellogg v. Kellogg, 166 Misc. 791, 4 N.Y.S.2d 219 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd mem. sub nom.
Kellogg v. Neale, 254 App. Div. 812, 5 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1938).
' Section 5 (1) (1931): "All dividends on shares of a corporation forming a part
of the principal which are payable in the shares of the corporation shall be deemed
principal. Subject to the provisions of this section, all dividends payable otherwise
than in the shares of the corporation itself, including ordinary and extraordinary
dividends and dividends payable in shares or other securities or obligations of
corporations other than the declaring corporation, shall be deemed income. Where the
trustee shall have the option of receiving a dividend either in cash or in shares
of the declaring corporation, it shall be considered as a cash dividend and deemed
income, irrespective of the choice made by the trustee."
As of 1963, twenty-nine states, which did not include Massachusetts, had adopted
the Uniform Principal and Income Act, some only after substantial revision. See
BOGERT § 816; 3 ScOTT § 241A.
7The Uniform Principal and Income Act adopted the so-called Massachusetts
rule, first laid down in Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 108 (1868), for allocating
corporate distributions: "A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends, however large,
as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital." Respondents argue that
Massachusetts does not in fact blindly follow the rule which bears its name and that
where the mode of payment does not accurately reflect the nature of the corporate
distribution, the source and not the form determines its allocation. Brief for
Respondents, pp. 9.15.
The minority or so-called Pennsylvania rule endeavors to allocate corporate
distributions according to source, requiring some apportionment between principal and
income. Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857). This rule applies only to extraordinary
dividends of cash or stock: the dividends are treated as income to the extent that
they constitute a distribution of earnings accruing since the creation of the trust,
but to the extent that they do not they are alloctaed to principal. Supporters of
this rule urge that it reaches a more equitable result than does the Massachusetts
rule. However, in the prefatory note to the Uniform Principal and Income Act,
the Commissioners, in rejecting the Pennsylvania rule, declared: "Experience has
shown that, however praiseworthy the intent, the [Pennsylvania] rule is unworkable,
since neither trustee nor court has the means to value the corporate assets in such
way as to secure the fair adjustment aimed at." HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 327 (1931).
See generally BOGERT §§ 841-52; LORING, A TRusTItE's HANDBOOK §§ 83-106 (Farr
Rev. 1962); 3 Scorr § 236 .15; Flickinger, A Trustee's Nightmare: Allocation of Stock
Dividends Between Income and Principal, 43 B.U.L. REv. 199 (1963).
8 The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act § 6 (c) (1962) provides, however,
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advanced for deciding the proper allocation of capital gains divi-
dends declared by a regulated investment company.
Where the actual intention of the settlor is discernible in the
trust instrument it must be carried out,9 provided it does not con-
travene public policy. In the absence of expressed intention, the
settlor might be presumed to favor the life beneficiary, who is more
apt to be the natural object of the settlor's bounty, rather than the
possibly remote remainderman;10 thus, the capital gains dividend
should go to income. This position, based on presumed intention,
seems tenuous, however, since it directly conflicts with the trustee's
duty to act impartially in any dealings affecting the beneficiaries."1
Because the return of ordinary income from a regulated invest-
ment company is sometimes comparatively low,12 it is urged that,
unless the income beneficiary is given the capital gains dividends, an
investment company is an unfair and improper investment for a
trust. However, it does not necessarily follow that the low income
return should be determinative of the proper allocation of dividends
between principal and income. In keeping with his duty to deal
impartially with all beneficiaries, the trustee must consider the
relative amounts of capital gains and ordinary income dividends, as
well as their proper allocation, when he selects any particular trust
investment; generally he should choose an investment company
that "Distributions made from ordinary income by a regulated investment company
.*. are income. All other distributions made by the company... including distribu-
tions from capital gains, depreciation, or depletion, whether in the form of cash or an
option to take new stock or cash or an option to purchase additinal shares, are
principal." See Barclay, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, 101
TpusTs & EsTAT S 833 (1962).
For criticism of this section, see Bogert, The Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act, 38 NOTRE DAME LAW. 50, 53-55 (1962).
1 E.g., In re Trusts under Will of Whitacre, 208 Minn. 286, 289, 293 N.W. 784, 785
(1940); In the Matter of Estate of Fisher, 115 N.J. Eq. 329, 332, 171 Atl. 169, 171
(Ct. Err. & App. 1934); In the Matter of Heinrich, 195 Misc. 803, 808, 90 N.Y.S.2d 875,
880 (Surr. Ct. 1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 236, comment b (1959); 3
SCOTT § 236.15; Comment, 31 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 224, 226-27 (1959).
20 BOGERT § 858, at 557; Comment, supra note 9, at 228; 3 Scorr § 236.3, at 1819-20
(casts some doubts on this presumption of the settlor's intent).
"I See, e.g., Security Trust Co. v. Mahoney, 307 Ky. 661, 668-69, 212 S.W.2d 115,
119 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §§ 183, 232 (1959); 2 Scorr § 183; 3 id. §
232.
12 BOGERT § 858, at 555, 559. For a compilation of data showing the capital gains
and income returns of a selected list of investment companies, see Long, The Index
of Mutual Investment Companies, 88 TRUSTS & ESTATEs 431, 432-33 (1949); Long,
Index of Mutual Funds, 96 TRUSTS & ESrATEs 48 (1957). See also WIESENBERCtR,
INVESTMENT COMPANIES 1963 pt. I, at 39-40 (23d annual ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as
WIESENERGER].
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which balances growth investments with income-producing invest-
ments.13 If the trustee chooses wisely, it is hard to see how the in-
come beneficiary is harmed.
Conversely, it may be persuasively contended on behalf of the
remainderman that it is unfair to allocate the capital gains dividends
to income. The burden of paying the initial investment charges
and expenses, which are substantial in the case of most investment
companies, usually falls upon principal.14 Hence, by returning
capital gains to principal, these costs can be recovered over a period
of time. If the capital gains dividends are allocated to income, this
gives the income beneficiary all the benefits resulting from a fluctu-
ating market, while the remainderman bears all the losses.15 Further-
more, if capital gains are not allocated to principal, the remainder-
man will be denied the normal appreciation in trust corpus which
usually occurs in an inflationary economy.'1  On the other hand,
reinvesting the capital gains in principal protects the remainderman
without being greatly detrimental to the life beneficiary: the remain-
derman is not prejudiced by bearing all the losses from an active
market, and the income beneficiary gets new and additional income
produced by the increased capital.
Because the rule adopted in Tait v. Peck requires the trustee
to allocate dividends according to their underlying source, it has
13 See authorities cited note 11 supra See also WIESENBERGER pt. I, at 62-74.
1" E.g., In the Matter of Estate of Campbell, 382 P.2d 920, 967 (Hawaii 1963); In the
Matter of Estate of Schepp, 9 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Patterson v. Old Dominion
Trust Co., 156 Va. 763, 159 S.E. 168 (1931); BOGERT § 803, at 142-43; RESTATEIENT
(SECOND), TRUSTS § 233, comment f (1959); 3 ScoTr § 233.3, at 1756. Both the Uniform
Principal and Income Act § 12 (2) (1931) and the Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act § 13 (c) (2) (a) (1962) charge the costs of investing and reinvesting to
principal.
Contra, Hite's Devisees v. Hite's Ex'r, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S.W. 778 (1892) (investment
expenses apportioned between income and principal); Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337,
78 N.E. 459 (1906) (income pays investment costs); Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 74 Ohio
App. 435, 59 N.E.2d 611 (1944) (income pays investment costs); Rhode Island Hosp.
Trust Co. v. Waterman, 23 R.I. 342, 50 At. 389 (1901) (apportioned investment costs).
2r Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707, 712 (Mass. 1963); Brief of the Investment Company
Institute as Amicus Curiae, p. 9; Brief for Respondents, pp. 18-20. See Putney,
Capital Gain Dividends-Should They Be Allocated to Income or Principal, 95 TRuSTS
& EsTATES 22 (1956); Shattuck, Capital Gain Distributions-Principal or Income?, 88
TRusTs & ESTATEs 160 (1949); Shattuck, Further Comment on Capital Gain Distribu-
tions, 88 TRusTS & ESTATES 429 (1949).
But see Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 353, 160 A.2d 601, 605 (1960)
(recognizing the argument, but finding it inapplicable in this case).
10 Tait v. Peck, supra note 15, at 708, 712; Brief of the Investment Company
Institute as Amicus Curiae, p. 7.
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been urged that difficult accounting problems may arise.17 In most
contexts this argument is quite persuasive. The minority rule,
requiring apportionment of the corporate distribution of earnings
according to source, while theoretically equitable, often involves
such complex accounting as to be impractical.18 However, appor-
tioning the dividends of regulated investment companies does not
necessitate intricate inquiries into the company's accounts to find the
source, since the company itself provides a break down of its distribu-
tion according to source, as required by law.' 9
In jurisdictions which have a policy against allowing the ac-
cumulation of income,20 declaring the capital gains dividend to be
principal, as done in this case, will permit more flexible drafting of
of trust agreements. 21 But where capital gains dividends are re-
garded as "income," trust agreements which authorize the trustee
to allocate these dividends to principal might be held invalid as an
attempt to accumulate income.22 On the other hand, holding capital
gains to be principal escapes this problem, since there is no corre-
27 194 N.E.2d at 713. Professor Scott says that simplicity is perhaps the strongest
argument in favor of the so-called Massachusetts rule, which allocates corporate
distributions according to form. 3 Scovr § 236.3, at 1818. See note 7 supra.
'
8 E.g., In re Arens, 72 N.J. Super. 310, 178 A.2d 119 (P. Ct. 1962); Flickinger,
supra note 7, at 211-29. See other authorities cited note 7 supra. See generally
BOGERT §§ 847-48; Cohan & Dean, supra note 3, for a discussion of the so-called
Pennsylvania or minority rule.
19 Investment Company Act § 80a-19, 54 Stat. 821 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-19 (1958):
"It shall be unlawful for any registered investment company to pay any dividend, or
to make any distribution in the nature of a dividend payment, wholly or partly
from any source other than- (I) such company's accumulated undistributed net income,
determined in accordance with good accounting practice and not including profits or
losses realized upon the sale of securities or other properties; or (2) such company's
net income so determined for the current or preceding fiscal year; unless such payment
is accompanied by a written statement which adequately discloses the source or sources
of such payment." (Emphasis added.)
The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act § 6(e) provides that "the trustee
may rely upon any statement of the distributing corporation as to any fact relevant
under any provision of this Act concerning the source or character of dividends or
distributions of corporate assets."
2' For a comprehensive discussion of the rules on accumulations, and a presentation
of the applicable provisions of various state statutes, see IA BOGERT §§ 215-17. See
also Note, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 284 (1959).
21 See generally Anderson, Should Capital Gain Distributions Be Principal or
Income?, 90 TRusis & ESTATES 530 (1951); Rogers, Capital Gain Distributions-Clauses
to Eliminate Question of Allocating Investment Company Dividends, 90 TRUSTs &
EsTATrs 300 (1951); Rogers, Capital Gain Dividends-A Suggestion for Draftsmen, 20
FORDHAM L. Rav. 79 (1951).
2E.g., Warden Trust, 382 Pa. 311, 115 A.2d 159 (1955); Maris's Estate, 301 Pa.
20, 151 At. 577 (1930). But see Equitable Trust Co. v. Prentice, 250 N.Y. 1, 164 N.E.
723 (1928); In the Matter of Heinrich, 195 Misc. 803, 90 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Surr. Ct. 1949).
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sponding prohibition against a settlor's providing in his trust deed
for the invasion of principal for the support of the income bene-
ficiary.23
The fact that Congress has adopted the conduit theory for
purposes of taxing the income of regulated investment companies
has been seized upon as an indication that these dividends should
be allocated to principal by the trustee.24 It is argued that if such
capital gains dividends are paid to the income beneficiary, Congress
might decide to tax them as ordinary income.25 This argument
seems spurious, however, since the source of a receipt, and not the
recipient, determines the designation for tax purposes. 26  Yet, in so
far as the tax policy recognizes and echos the underlying economic
realities of investment companies, the tax aspect is a persuasive indi-
cation that capital gains dividends are, in fact, a return of principal.
Perhaps the basic controversy centers around the disagreement
as to the purposes and functions of regulated investment com-
panies. 27 Investment companies are a special type of corporation
which are closely regulated by the Investment Company Act of
1940.28 Their primary business purpose consists of investing, rein-
vesting, or trading in securities. 29 They provide a way for relatively
small investors to pool and invest their funds to secure expert invest-
ment management and broad diversification of risk.30 Investment
companies differ from other types of trading corporations in that
they do not engage in such business activities as manufacturing, min-
ing, retailing, or transportation. Through their activity of investing,
reinvesting, and trading their portfolio securities, investment com-
23 See 2 ScoTT § 128.7.
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 852. An investment company which distributes at
least 90% of its ordinary income to its shareholders is not taxed on this income. §
852 (a) (1). Instead the stockholder pays the regular federal income tax on this
income. However, dividends designated by the investment company as capital gains
are taxed at the long term capital gains rate. § 852 (b) (3) (B). Even if the capital
gains are retained by the company, they are still taxed at the capital gains rate, and
the shareholder may claim a credit on his tax return for the tax paid by the mutual
fund. § 852 (b) (3) (D).
.1 See BOGERT § 858, at 556. Professor Bogert rejects this argument.
20 E.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 521 (1921); In the
Matter of Estate of Byrne, 192 Misc. 451, 81 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1948); Lovett Estate
(No. 2), 78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. 1951). See BOGERT § 858, at 557.
27 See, e.g., the discussions of Shattuck and Young, cited supra note 3.
"154 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1958). See Note, The Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 41 CoLUM. L. REV. 269 (1941).
-'Investment Company Act, supra note 28, at § 80a-3 (a) (1). See generally
WVIESENBERGER Pt. I.
3 See Note, supra note 28. See also WIESENBERGER pt. I, at 18-21.
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panies realize profits which they are required to break down into
capital gains and ordinary income, and all of which they generally
pay out to their shareholders as dividends.31
On behalf of the income beneficiaries, it is argued that a regu-
lated investment company should be treated just like any other
ordinary, corporate entity and that all the profits, including the part
from capital gains, should be allocated to income.3 2  The portifolio
securities are considered tantamount to the "working capital" or
inventory of the company, as distinguished from permanent capital
assets.33 Furthermore, analogies are drawn to the situations where
a corporation's business is buying and selling land from which it
realizes its profits, 34 or where one corporation divests itself of stock
which it holds in another and distributes the proceeds in cash or in
its own stock at the option of the recipient:3 5 in both of these cases
the dividends go to income.
In opposition to this pure entity treatment, it is contended that
it is more realistic to regard a regulated investment company in the
nature of a conduit for passing the profits on to the proper benefici-
ary as if the trustee had owned the underlying stocks directly.30 The
reasons for which an investor chooses to invest in an investment com-
pany have no connection with the investment company's corporate
form. 7 There may be no other way open for a trustee to get ex-
11 WIESENBERGER pt. I, at 39-46; Choka, An Introduction to Investment Companies,
3 PRAc. LAw 48 (Feb. 1957).
'" See cases cited note 4 supra.
33 E.g., Young, A Dissent on Capital Gain Distributions, 88 TRUSTS & ESTAisS 280
(1949).
31E.g., In the Matter of Estate of Gartenlaub, 185 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 90 (1921);
Krug v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co., 133 Md. 110, 104 At. 414 (1918); Reed v.
Head, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 174 (1863); Matter of Jackson, 258 N.Y. 281, 179 N.E. 496
(1932); 3 Scoir § 236.14, at 1843. But see Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Bradlcy,
41 R.I. 174, 103 Atl. 486 (1918).
sr See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Jameson, 256 Mass. 179, 152 N.E. 52 (1926)
(dividend of subsidiary's stock goes to income); Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d 874
(Mo. 1957) (optional cash or stock dividend goes to income); City Bank Farmers
Trust Co. v. Ernst, 263 N.Y. 342, 189 N.E. 241 (1934) (dividend of subsidiary's stock
goes to income); In the Matter of Estate of Appleby, 15 Misc. 2d 200, 175 N.Y.S.2d
176 (Surr. Ct. 1958), 27 FORDHAm L. REv. 645 (1958-1959) (optional cash or stock
dividend goes to income); UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INcoME Aar § 5 (1), note 6 supra;
Flickinger, supra note 7, at 200-01.
36 Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707, 712-14 (Mass. 1963); Brief of the Investment
Company Institute as Amicus Curiae, pp. 11-15; Brief for Respondents, pp. 5-9. See
Putney, supra note 15, at 24.
37See Ewart, Principal and Income Problems of Trustees with Mutual Fund
Dividends, 95 TRusTs & EsTAms 1025, 1028 (1956).
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perienced management and risk diversification in his investments.8
Instead of the trustee's owning directly a small number of shares
in a large number of investments (often an impossibility in small
trusts, and inconvenient in large ones), the trustee owns shares of an
investment company, which in turn invests the money paid by the
trustee for its stock in the stock of other companies. 39
To buttress this argument for treating investment companies as
a conduit, an analogy may be drawn to common trust funds set up
by banks as trustees. 40 In common trust funds the assets of several
trusts are commingled and invested by the trustee-bank in a group
of securities, each estate managed by the trustee-bank having a frac-
tional interest in the whole group. The same advantages of experi-
enced management, risk diversification, and convenience realized
through the investment company are found in common trust funds.41
Notably, capital gains realized by buying and selling the portfolio
securities of a common trust fund are returned to principal.42 Also,
capital gains received by a trustee from the sale of securities held by
himself as trustee, and not a part of any common trust fund or in-
vestment company, are allocated to principal.43
38 Common trust funds are restricted to funds maintained by a bank as trustee, and
are controlled by rules of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. No
funds of any outsider can be invested in the common trust fund. The maximum
amount from any one trust which can be invested in a common trust fund is
$100,000. See 12 C.F.R. § 206.17 (1959); 3 SCOTT § 227.9, at 1684-85; Capron, The
Federal Reserve Board Regulations of Common Trust Funds, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
439 (1938).
11 Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707, 712 n.9 (Mass. 1963). See WIESENBERGER pt. V, for
a listing of the various stocks comprising the portfolios of the individual investment
companies.
"1 Tait v. Peck, supra note 39, at 712-13. However, the analogy is not perfect,
since there are no fees, in addition to the trustee's commission, charged for the
management services of a common trust fund as contrasted to the substantial initial
costs of investing in investment companies. 12 C.F.R. § 206.17 (c)(8) (1959). The
court suggested that a trustee who invests in regulated investment companies should
perhaps receive a lower trustee's commission because he is not burdened with the
investment management. However, "[t]he possible meager return does not change
the substance of the investment as a reasonable attempt at risk diversification similar
to that of the common trust fund." Tait v. Peck, supra at 713. See BorFRT § 679,
at 311-13; 3 Scorr § 227.9A.
By the better rule, these investment costs should properly be borne by principal.
See authorities cited note 14 supra and accompanying text.
13 Sco-r § 227.9, at 1683.
62 Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707, 713 (Mass. 1965); Ward, Problems in the Adminis-
tration of Common Trust Funds, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 453, 460-61 (1938).
" E.g., In re Trust under Will of Koffend, 218 Minn. 206, 225, 15 N.W.2d 590, 599
(1940); Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 341-43, 290 N.W. 758, 785 (1940). See RErvATE-
MENT (SECOND), TRUsTS § 236(f), comment x, at 580 (1959): "A dividend which repre-
sents only the natural growth or increase in value of the property representing the
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There is no essential economic difference between capital gains
realized by the trustee on sales of trust securities which he holds
directly, or as part of a common trust fund, and capital gains re-
sulting from the sale of securities from the investment company
portfolio. The only real difference is the intervention of the corpo-
rate entity." While recognizing that an investment company is a
legal, corporate entity for some purposes, it is being overly con-
ceptualistic to conclude that this must dictate the proper allocation
of a dividend between principal and income for trust purposes. On
balance, it seems that the conduit theory, by allocating capital gains
dividends to principal and ordinary dividends to income, more
nearly accords with the economic facts, and with the basic purposes
and functions of a regulated investment company.
From the trustee's point of view, probably the most important
consideration is to establish a definite, workable rule of law. The
rule announced in Tait v. Peck satisfies this need, is fair and simple,
has recently been enacted by several state legislatures, 45 and follows
the position adopted by the Revised Uniform Principal and Income
Act in 1962.46 However, the rule in Tait v. Peck47 probably should
be limited to the regulated investment company situation, where
the company itself denominates the source of the dividend. Other-
wise the trustee may once again find himself entangled in the compli-
cated accounting jungle of tracing the source of the receipts and
apportioning ihem between principal and income.
original capital of the corporation, or of the permanent property or good will, is
principal." See also 3 Scor § 236.14, at 1841-42.
11 Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707, 713 (Mass. 1963); Brief of the Investment Company
Institute as Amicus Curiae, p. 11.
", See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 690.06 (Supp. 1962); N.Y. PErs. PROP. L W § 17 (a)
(Supp. 1963).
"6 See note 8 supra.
"7 194 N.E.2d at 713-14.
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